RECENT CASES by unknown
RECENT CASES
ASSAULT-DEFENSE OF PROPERTY-ATTACHMENT.-STATE V. SELENGUT, 95
ATm. (R. I.) 503.-Held, the owner of property resisting an officer, attach-
ing his property as that of another, is guilty of assault and battery.
It is a general rule that one rfiay use reasonable force in the protection
of his property against a trespasser. People v. Elixeira, 123 Cal. 297;
Wright v. Southern Express Co., 8o Fed. 85. It is also well settled that
an officer becomes a trespasser when he attempts to attach property with-
out authority. Lassiter v. State, 163 S. W. (Tex.) 710; State v. Hartley,
75 Conn. io4. The officer acts at his peril, in attaching property, that he
attach the right property. And the owner may use reasonable force to
prevent the seizure of his property under an attachment against the
property of another, under the rule laid down in Comm. v. Kennard, 8
Pick. (Mass.) 133; Smith v. State, io5 Ala. 136; Wentworth v. People,
5 Ill. 136. However, the rule as laid down in the principal case is followed
in New York, Ohio, New Hampshire and Vermont. People v. Hall, 31
Hun. (N. Y.) 4o4; Fars v. State, 3 Ohio St. 159; State v. Richardson,
38 N. H. 208; State v. Buchanan, 17 Vt. 575, cited in instant case.
The latter cases take the position that, when an officer takes property
wrongfully, it may be replevied, and this is considered the wiser and
more expedient course. C. Y. B.
BILLS AND NOTES-PAROL EvIDnNcE-A-MBIGUrrY-INDoRSER.-OVER-
LAND AUTO Co. v. WINTERS ET AL., 180 S. W. (Mo.) 561.-A note reading
"We promise to pay" was signed by one Winters; the appellant, his
associate in business, signed on the back. Held, a person placing his sig-
nature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor,
is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate
words his intention to be bound in some other capacity, and the legal
effect of this blank endorsement cannot be varied by parol evidence.
Ellison, P. J., dissenting.
The decision of the court is based upon section 63 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law. Parol evidence is only admitted to show the real
meaning where there is an ambiguity. Couturie v. Roensch, 134 S. W.
(Tex.) 413; Plonters Chemical and Oil Co. v. Stearits, 66 So. (Ala.)
699; Harding v. Harding-Coor Co., 218 Fed. 715. An ambiguous "We
promise" has been explained by parol evidence in Dunbar Box and Lum-
ber Co. v. Martin, 1O3 N. Y. Supp. 9i, and in New England Electric Co.
v. Shrok, 145 Pac. (Cal.) lOO2. In view of these decisions, the conten-
tion of the dissenting justice that the appellant could be found a co-maker
by the explaining of the ambiguous "we promise" in the note seems to
be well founded. See Long v. Gwini, 66 So. (Ala.) 88. However, a strict
construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law has been followed in
most jurisdictions. National Exch. Bank v. Lubram, 29 R. I. 64; Bal-
2nersh v. Kuntz, 53 Fla. 340; Burwell v. Gaylord, 119 Minn. 426.
A. S. B.
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CARRIERS-CONNECTING SERVICES-RELATION OF CARRIER AND PASSENGER
AT JUNCTIoN-PoINT.-TEXAS & PACIFIC Ry. Co. v. BIGGER ET AL., 36 Sup.
CT. REP. (U. S.) i27-In an action for the death of a passenger from
exposure at a junction-point, held, that under a contract to connect with
another carrier for a destination beyond the contracting carrier's own
route, the relation of carrier and passenger continues while the latter is
waiting for connections, although the defendant's own portion of the
transportation has been completed. White, C. J., and Van Devanter and
McReynolds, J. J., dissenting.
The extraordinary liability of a carrier to a passenger ceases with the
termination of the perils incident to the journey. Smith v. Ry. Co., 29
Ore. 539. In the case of carriers providing a place of egress, the relation
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time and opportunity
to avail himself of the means of egress in safety. Ry. Co. v. Krouse, 30
Ohio St. 222. Where the defendant's contract contemplates intermediate
changes, the protection continues during the waiting interval. Baldwin
v. Ry. Co., 68 Conn. 567. It does not, however, extend to one waiting
for a connection not within the contemplation of the defendant's con-
tract. See Powell v. Ry. Co., 22o Pa. St. 638. A carrier of passengers
on a through-route coupon is generally held to assume responsibility only
with respect to his own portion of the route. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S.
333. It has been held, however, that in such cases his responsibility as
a carrier continues until a similar responsibility has been assumed by the
next succeeding carrier. Knight v. Ry. Ca., 56 Me. 234. Other authori-
ties relieve him from the carrier's liability upon the safe delivery of the
passenger at the junction-point Davis v. Ry. Co., 25 Tex. Civ. App. 8.
The former view clearly advances beyond the doctrine of Baldwzn v.
Ry. Co., supra, but is supported by the imperfect analogy from connecting
carriers of freight. Ry. Co. v. Young, 25 Neb. 651.
C. R. W.
COMUERCE-INTER-STATE COmmERCE CommisSioN-PowER To REQUIRE
PROVISION OF TANK-CARs.-PENN. Ry. Co. v. U. S. ET AL., 227 FED. 911.-
Under Interstate Commerce Act, Sect. I, defining "transportation" as
including cars, and requiring every carrier "to provide such transporta-
tion upon reasonable request therefor," held, that the Interstate Commerce
Commission has no power to require a railroad company to provide tank
cars for use by an oil refinery. Thompson, D. J., dissenting.
By the common law as applied to carriers in general, the duty to pro-
vide facilities was limited to the actual equipment. Steamship Co. v.
Work & Supply Co., 131 Ga. 831 (ship-owner). Special public callings,
however, are bound to provide for reasonably foreseeable public needs.
Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 74 Ark. 597. This involves the provision of such
cars as may be the only suitable and proper kind for any regular species
of traffic. Forrester v. Ry. Co., 147 N. C. 553 (ventilated cars, for fruit).
Long-established usage may enlarge this duty. Steamship Co. v. Ry. Co.,
1O4 Md. 693. Statutes relating in general terms to the provision of facili-
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ties are presumably to be construed with reference to the common law.
Hardware Ca. v. Ry. Co., 15o N. C. 703. Accordingly the provision under
construction has been construed as extending only to the prevention of
discrimination and not to the specification of proper facilities on grounds
of expediency. Elev. Co. v. Ry. Co., i1o Minn. 25, 36. The established
power of the commission to regulate, with a view to equal treatment, the
distribution of particular kinds of cars, should be distinguished from the
principal case. L C. C. v. Ry. Co., 215 U. S. 452 (coal cars). Similarly
the power to pass upon the expediency of practices affecting rates, in fixing
rate schedules. State v. Ry. Co., 47 Ohio St. 130 (tank cars v. bbl.
packages). C. R. W.
CoNsTiTuTIONAL LAW-DuE PROCEss-PoLICE POWE-DiscRimiNATioN
AGAINST LABOR UNioN--JAcKsow ET AL. V. BERGER, 11o N. E. (Ohio)
732.-Held, that a statute making it a criminal offense for an employer
to discharge or threaten to discharge an employee because of affiliation
with a labor organization is unconstitutional, being contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted primarily for the protection
of the negro, when it was discovered, that, although the Thirteenth
Amendment had abolished slavery, legislation restricting his liberty was
being enacted. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. However, it was
later construed to include the securing of equal rights for all persons.
Ex Parte Virginia, zoo U. S. 339. Contractual rights, as a specie of prop-
erty, or as included within the definition of liberty, are fully protected
by the due process clauses. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 336. So the
liberty of entering into labor contracts is within the constitutional guar-
antee. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66. The Fourteenth
Amendment did not take from the states the police powers reserved to
them at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U. S. 27. The police power of a state is broad; its limits are difficult
to determine. Comn. v. Alger, 7 Cushing (Mass.) 84. Although it has
been expanded, due to the changing conditions of society, yet it cannot
be used as a cloak for oppressive and unjust legislation which makes
unequal restrictions. Holden v. Hardy, supra; Barbier v. Connolly,
supra. The Federal government was held to be unable to enact a law
similar to that of the principal case, as contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. z6r. So a state, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was placed under a similar restriction in the enactment
of such a law. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. z; State ex rel. Smith
v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155. The authorities are in accord that such legis-
lation as was enacted in Ohio, in an effort to prevent discrimination against
labor unions, is unconstitutional, being contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in that it abridges the employer in his freedom of contract, whereas
the employee is in no respect hampered. Coppage v. Kausas, supra; see
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LocAL OPTIoN-PoWER OF LEGISLATURE TO REGU-
LATE AFTER VOTE BY COUNTY.-EX Parte Pricha, 70 So. (Fla.) 4o6.-The
constitution of Florida provided that the counties might determine whether
the sale of intoxicants should be prohibited therein. After a county had
voted to allow the sale, the legislature enacted that in those counties where
the sale was permitted, no intoxicants could be sold in less quantities than
one half pint, and then only in sealed receptacles, and not to be consumed
on the premises. Held, such law is constitutional. Taylor, C. J., and
Ellis, J., dissenting.
The legislature has the power to regulate the liquor traffic in the absence
of a constitutional provision to the contrary. People v. Schafrau, 168
Mich. 324. The power to regulate is not the power to prohibit. Andrews
v. State, 5o Tenn. 165; Mernaugh v. City of Orlando, 41 Fla. 433. Nor
does the power to regulate confer power virtually to prohibit. Ex parte
Patterson, 41 Tex. Cr. Rep. 256. As this statute neither prohibits nor
virtually prohibits the liquor traffic, it seems that it is a valid exercise of
the police power. The construction put upon this local option clause of
the constitution-that it merely gives the power to decide whether or not
the sale shall be absolutely prohibited-is in accord with that of other
courts. The Kentucky court in construing a similar statute, says in Board
of Trustees v. Scott, 125 Ky. 545: "The only thing that ever has been
submitted is: Shall the sale be prohibited? If the vote is that it shall
not be, then the sale is nevertheless subject to police regulation by the
state. .... In fine, the effect of a 'wet' vote has always been con-
strued to be that the legislature is then left a free hand to deal with the
traffic in such community as may seem to it to be expedient." R. C. W.
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS-PROSECUTION OF APEAL.-IN MATTER OF
CITY OF NEW YoRK V. GREEN, Nxw YORKc LAW JOURNAL, JAN. 19, igi6.-
Held, In condemnation proceedings, the owner of the land may accept
payment of award and still prosecute an appeal on ground that award was
insufficient.
It is settled, as a general rule, that after a party receives payment of a
judgment or decree, he cannot appeal therefrom, or prosecute an appeal
theretofore taken. Ducy v. Patterson, ii9 Am. St. Rep. (Colo.) 284;
People ex rel. Dunn v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645. The reasons for the general
rule as tersely stated in Paine v. Woolley, 8o Ky. 568 are as follows: "If
the collection of the judgment be right, the appeal must be wrong, and
if the appeal is well taken, the judgment ought not to have been collected."
There is an exception to the general rule, namely, where the amount
found in favor of the litigant by the judgment or decree is due him in
any event, the only question to be determined by the appellate court is
whether or not he is to receive a greater or an additional sum; then his
acceptance of the amount awarded him by the judgment which he seeks
to review does not preclude him from prosecuting a writ of error to obtain
more. Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354; Jackson v. Brockton, 182 Mass.
26. The distinction between the cases in which the acceptance of the fruits
of the judgment bars the appeal, and those that do not is, whether or not
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there is a possibility that the appellant will have to refund part of the
amount received. In the principal case there is a possibility that the com-
missioners, upon a second appraisal, will make the award smaller, which
would seem to place the principal case in the class barred by acceptance
of the fruits of the judgment. .
Foo---DisEAsED MEAT-AcTIoN AGAINST PACKER-DEFENSE-INSPECTION.
-CATANI V. SwiFT & Co., 95 AmL. (PA.) 93I.-In an action against the
packer to recover for injury resulting to a consumer from the diseased
condition of meat sold to the consumer by a dealer in the original packages,
held, it is not defense that the meat was inspected and approved by federal
inspectors under Act of Congress (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, Sects. 8717-8728)
authorizing such inspection. Brown, C. J., dissenting.
A statute of Pennsylvania provided that "in every sale of meats, lard
and other articles used for food . . . there shall be an implied contract
that the goods are sound and fit for household consumption.' P. L. 87,
3 P. & L. Dig., 2d E., p. 6727. The federal act of March, 1907 (34 U. S.
Stat. 1256), provides that "any person who shall sell or offer for sale or
transportation for interstate or foreign commerce, any meat or meat food
products which are diseased . . . or otherwise unfit for human food,
knowing such meat food products are intended for human consumption,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Neither of these statutes says anything
about negligence.
I Independently of statute, however, there are many cases which allow the
ultimate consumer to recover against the packer or manufacturer. Manu-
facturer of pies, Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, L. R. A. 1915 C. 179;
bottler of coca-cola, Jackson Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 64 So. (Miss.) 791;
pork packer held liable to ultimate consumer for injuries resulting from
packer's failure to inspect, Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 2oo Fed. 322. Some
cases base the right of the ultimate consumer to recover on an implied
warranty of the manufacturer. Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 Ill. App.
117. "And such warranty is available to all who may be damaged, includ-
ing the retailer as well as the ultimate consumer." Mazetti v. Armour
& Co., 75 Wash. 622. But it has been held that retailers and innkeepers
and victuallers furnishing such goods for food are not liable for the
injuries resulting, though the food is in fact poisonous, Trafton v. Davis,
1o Me. 318 (i. e., in the absence of evidence of negligence on the retailer's
part) ; Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519. Contra, Doyle v. Fuerst &
Kraemer, 129 La. 838. The decision of the principal case seems clearly
right on principle and under the statutes involved. S. B.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-APPEAL-JIJRISDICTION-FCTITioUS SET-OFF AND
CUNTERmAIm.--ROsE v. O'BUN ET AL., 87 S. E. (W. VA.) 378.-Held,
That a defendant in an action before a justice of the peace is not per-
mitted to file a fictitious and unproved set-off or counterclaim, and thereby
raise the amount in controversy so as to bring it within the appellate
jurisdiction of a circuit or superior court.
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It is a fairly well established rule of law that a defendant may set up a
bona fide counterclaim and increase the amount in controversy up to the
amount where an appeal may be had. Hutts v. Williams, 55 Ind. 237;
Parks v. Hulne, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 499. Contra, Ross v. Evans, 30 Minn.
2o6. But to entitle the defendant to an appeal he must offer evidence in
the trial before the justice of the peace to support it, else he will be pre-
sumed to have abandoned it. Kurtz v. Hoffman, 65 Iowa 26o; Texas &
N. 0. R. R. Co. v. Hook, 3o Tex. Civil App. 325. If it clearly appear,
however, that the defendant has introduced a fictitious counterclaim for
the manifestly obvious purpose of increasing the amount in controversy
so as to bring it within the limit of appeal, no appeal will be allowed.
Manchester Paper-Mills Co. v. Heth, IS S. E. (Va.) 189; Steele v. Walton,
3 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 211; Northern Pacific Rwy. Co. v. Booth, 152 U. S. 671.
Furthermore, where it is shown that an appeal from a justice's court is
improperly pending before a county court, the latter may and should refuse
as a matter of law to take jurisdiction of it. Edwards v. M1Iandemack, 13
Ill. 633; Chicago & IV. W. Rwy. Co. v. Weaver, 112 Iowa, ioi. Bad faith
on part of defendant can never be presumed, however, and the counter-
claim must be patently fictitious before a court will dismiss it. Bickford
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 67 Vt. 418; Filler v. Tyler, 91 Va. 458. The rule laid
down in the principal case denying an appeal on a fictitious counterclaim,
is clearly correct.
L. W. B.
PREWARDs-CoMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS.-SIMPSON V. TWENTY-EIGHETH
ST. Co., 156 N. Y. Supp. 87.-A reward was offered for lost rings, "no
questions asked," if returned to the office of the Prince George Hotel.
The plaintiff gave information to the effect that she had seen the rings
taken, and personally identified the taker, thus leading to criminal pro-
ceedings by which the rings were recovered. Held, that plaintiff was not
entitled to the reward. Bijur, J., dissenting.
An offer of reward is governed by the ordinary rules of contract:
namely, that the offerer may prescribe what terms he chooses, and
there must be substantial compliance with such terms. Stair v.
Heska Am one Congregation, 159 S. W. (Tenn.) 840; Zwolanek
v. Baker Mfg. Co., 15o Wis. 517. The precise situation in the prin-
cipal case is infrequent, if not unique, inasmuch as such an offer is
intended to induce the supposed wrongdoer to return the goods and
consequently the question whether performance has taken place does
not usually arise. Here there is much similarity to those cases
where a reward is offered for the "arrest and conviction" of an
offender. On this point, courts differ as to what constitutes substan-
tial compliance. According to one line of holdings, the reward is not
earned by any amount of information alone, so long as the plaintiff
does not himself do the acts of arresting and prosecuting. Chambers v.
Ogle, 174 S. W. (Ark.) 532; McClaughry v. King, 79 C. C. A. (Ark.)
9I; Williams v. West Chicago St. R. Co., 191 Ill. 61o. The opposite view
is taken in some decisions, which declare that procuring the arrest and
conviction by giving the necessary information is sufficient performance
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to entitle to recovery. Bloomfield v. Maloney, i42 N. W. (Mich.) 785;
Elkins v. Board of Commissioners of Wyandotte County, 91'Kan. 518;
Stone v. Wickliffe, io6 Ky. 252. Even if the criminal is killed, resisting
arrest, and never brought to trial. Smith v. State, 15I Pac. (Nev.) 512.
The principal case is quite evidently decided along the stricter lines of
the former of the above groups; dissenting Judge Bijur seeming to prefer
the interpretation of the second. Clearly the dominant object of the
offer-the return of the rings-has been achieved by the plaintiff.
Nevertheless she did not return them, nor cause them to be returned to
the office, as stipulated. Furthermore, though doing all that lay within
her power, she did not herself complete the process she set in motion.
C. B.
TRusTs-CONsTRUCTIVE TRus--DEsTRUcrIoN OF CoDIcn. BY TESTATOR
RELYING ON PROMISE OF DEViSE-THARP v. THARP, 40 LAW TIMES, III-
Testator limited his estate to use of defendant for life, with power of
appointment in defendant, and in default of appointment to plaintiff. Sub-
sequently he executed a codicil to the will omitting the power of appoint-
ment. Defendant promised the testator's wife that he would appoint to
the plaintiff, if the power was given him. Testator, relying on this prom-
ise, destroyed the codicil. Defendant appointed to himself. Held, the
plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that defendant holds for him.
Whenever title to realty or personalty is obtained by one under such
circumstances as would render his retention of it a fraud on another who
in justice is entitled thereto, equity will impress the subject matter with a
trust. Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81 Me. 137; Bacon v. Bacon, i5o Cal. 477.
Where one, on the making of a will, or thereafter, expressly or impliedly
promises testator that he will hold for a particular purpose, and the testator
relies thereon, equity will raise a trust to enforce the promise. Jones v.
Badley, L. R- 3 Ch. 362; Benbrook et al. v. Yancy, 96 Miss. 536; White-
house v. Bolster, 95 Me. 458. Where an heir by his promises to use the
property in a particular manner prevents the making of a will, whereby
an intestacy results, equity will create a trust. Grant v. Bradstreet, 87 Me.
583. The same is held where one prevents a change in a will. Dowd v.
Tucker, 41 Conn. 197. Actual fraudulent intent at the time of the repre-
sentation is not necessary. Powell v. Yearance, 73 N. J. Eq. 117. The
novelty of the principal case lies in the fact that a power of appointment
was left in the will at the instance of the donee, while in the cases cited
a direct gift of property was either made or withheld at the instance of the
person who expected to reap the benefits.
R. C. W.
WmLs-ABROGATIoN BY AGREEMENT-PRESUMPTION-LAPSE OF TIME.-
HENDERSON V. Bisxop, 95 ATL. (PA.) 663.-Where decedent's widow and
heirs, claiming that they were the only parties interested in his estate,
agreed in a writing, which was duly recorded, that the will should be
destroyed and that they should take under the intestate laws, and for
more than thirty years thereafter neither the agreement nor the pos-
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session of those holding under it was questioned, held: the presumption
was that all parties interested in the will had signed the agreement.
Moschzisker, J., dissenting.
A contract between the beneficiaries of a will, renouncing the provisions
of the will and providing for a division of the property is valid and
enforceable. In re Stone's Estate, 1O9 N. W. (Iowa) 455. Also an
executory agreement between the heirs founded on mutual and valuable
consideration for a settlement of their testator's estate is enforceable.
Kirkman v. Hodgin, 151 N. C. 588. And it is a natural corollary that
both the beneficiaries under a will and the testator's heirs may make a
valid agreement inter se disposing of the property contrary to the pro-
visions of the will. Apgar v. Connell, 79 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 531. Where
the will is destroyed by agreement of all the parties in interest, the result
is to vest an undivided interest in the heirs at law, even without a written
contract to that effect. Dueringer v. Klocke, 149 N. Y. Supp. 332. But
on the other hand it has been held in Wisconsin that parties interested in a
testate estate are not competent to substitute their will for that of the
testator and a court is powerless to give validity to any such scheme.
Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 136 N. W. (Wis.) 956. And an agreement between
beneficiaries of a will, which destroys a valid trust thereby created and
allows the property to come directly to the cestui, thus radically upsetting
the testator's scheme, cannot be enforced. Brady v. Hanson, 68 Misc. Rep.
(N. Y.) 198. The point as to a presumption arising by mere length of
tenure of those holding under such an agreement as this-i. e., a presump-
tion that all parties interested in the will had signed the agreement-seems
to be new. From the facts of the case it would seem that the statute of
limitations should be decisive of the question, without a reference to any
presumptions of any Idnd.
S. B.
